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Decentralization of Natural Resources Management in the Lao PDR: 
A case study of the multi-village Mak Jong management group  






This study introduces the process involved in a case of sustainable forest and wetland 
management. It analyzes the type and extent of decentralization that is practiced in 
Pathoumphone district (Champassack province in Southern Laos) together with the 
development of two local institutions and the legal framework related to this 
development. The Mak Jong management group (MJG) and the District Field Wetland 
Management team (DFWMT) were created due to the lack of a management system, a 
continuous decline in Mak Jong (MJ) trees and an increase in the number of conflicts 
over the use of wetland resources (IUCN,2008).  The MJG came about as the result of 
a request from local authorities and communities, while the DFWMT resulted from an 
official request following the Lao PDR’s accession to the Ramsar Convention.  
Villagers strongly represented themselves through both groups at the local level and 
took actions to ensure the governance of natural resources as their area of responsibility, 
complied with their agreements1 and followed the legal framework2, including the 
mechanisms for sharing profits and benefits among themselves and their village units. 
Transferring rights to local communities and institutions over forests and wetlands are 
the most significant efforts to conserve and rehabilitate forests and wetlands, while 
simultaneously being able to provide local communities with ownership of their areas 
together with the opportunity to engage in economic activities, such as agriculture, 
livestock and ecotourism. Decentralization regarding the natural resources in this 
district has not yet been fully implemented, however, as can be seen from the absence of 
the role and rights of local people in the current policy framework, and both the 
villagers and the local authorities are still concerned about the long-term viability of the 
MJG and DFWMT, as there has not yet been a complete transfer of power3. Therefore, 
                                                   
** Latsamay Sylavong, a Visiting Research Scholar, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 
and former Country Representative of IUCN Lao during 1998-2013. 
1 There are 2 agreements in the participatory approach, one within each village, and  the other with all 
villages in the same village cluster.  There is no DFWT agreement.  
2 There are 2 regulations for the MJG (the first, for key NTFPs, was prepared in 2008, and the second, as 
amended, specifically for MJ). There is 1 regulation for the DFWMT. All were carried out through a 
series of consultations with all the villagers (different groups) at each village, with other villages within a 
village cluster, and with other village clusters. 
3 The MJG is incomplete due to the level at which it has been approved, i.e., only at the district and 
provincial levels, and not through an agreement or local regulation that would be properly reflected 
within a legal framework. As per the request by the MJG, the group should be upgraded and take the form 
of a local association – to match the local CSO decree (PMO, 2009), which has a higher profile that 
would allow the MJG to negotiate with traders and enjoy a proper network with local authorities.    
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decentralization regarding natural resources should be taken into account by both the 
central and local governments and a compromise reached in order to meet both the 
needs and priorities of the local people and the government’s interests in meeting 
government commitments and achieving national targets. 
 




Decentralization has been introduced globally over the last two decades (Ribot, 1999), 
especially in developing countries. The government of the Lao PDR has been 
implementing decentralization since the late 1980s as can be seen in the development of 
many initiatives and policies that are focused on enhancing the capacity of the central 
government to transfer authority and responsibilities to local administrations, including 
with regard to advocating a decentralized approach to forest management 
(Phouangparisak, P, 2000). This was mostly reflected in the introduction of the New 
Economic Mechnism (NEM), which constituted a shift away from a centrally planned 
economy, e.g. UNDP support on “Governance Public Administration Reform (GPAR)” 
in 1997. Then the SDC added its support in 2003 (in 2 provinces) and expanded this 
support until phase 3 (2012 to 2015) in 66 districts in 6 provinces to focus on “Support 
for a better service delivery project” (UNDP, 2012). It then sought support in a new 
ministry called the “Ministry of Home Affairs”. In addition, the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, with UNDP support, has focused on strengthening private investment and 
mainstreaming the social environment for all investment at all levels under its Poverty 
Environment Initiatives (UNDP, 2013).  In addition, the Water Resources and 
Environment Administration (WREA) received support from Sida for the “Strengthening 
Environmental Management” (SEM) project (2 phases), which was then followed by 
support from Finland with a similar focus on enhancing capacity regarding 
environmental governance at the center and in key provinces (WREA, 2007). Overall, 
the right to decision-making still remains with the central government as can be seen in 
the great focus and the efforts made at the central level, due to the fact that the central 
government system is still weak in terms of its capacity and ability to coordinate across 
sectors (Bikash Ranjan Dash, 2004). 
 
During the past two decades, many initiatives relevant to decentralization have been 
designed mostly to reflect the NEM and meet donor requirements through various 
projects at both the policy and community levels to support the sustainable use of natural 
resources and properly enforce conservation regulations, including the development of 
different institutional arrangements to engage local communities in various types of 
natural resources management. Recent experiences from recent projects like SUFORD 
(many provinces and districts) and BCI, which started with Champassack province and is 
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currently expanding to other southern provinces, are relevant to this decentralization 
regarding natural resources which aims to achieve the sustainable management of natural 
production forests (PMO, 2002), protect the forests (PMO, 2010) and the national 
protected areas (NA, 2007), and alleviate rural poverty through the transfer of 
responsibility for management, control and decision-making to local communities. These 
interventions have been implemented and led mostly by the center, but some 
responsibilities have been transferred to the provincial authorities (Steering Committees 
are usually chaired by the minister or the provincial governor).  It has been found that 
there are some limits on local authorities’ engagement, especially at the village and 
district levels, due to the institutional complexity of the institutional arrangements and 
requirements demanded by donors (the WB and ADB, respectively) during the design 
and implementation of the project, and because of concerns regarding the granting of 
rights to local groups and people regarding natural resources due to local authorities’ 
accountability with respect to the management of their control over these resources. 
 
In relation to forest resources management, many projects have been carried out in land 
use planning and land allocation (LUPLA) nationwide with their primary focus being the 
transfer of rights and the allocation of responsibilities for forest resources to local people. 
However, these projects have only been employed as a way to reduce the areas where 
shifting cultivation takes place and opium is cultivated.  As LUPLA was conducted at 
the village level by a technical team (including DAFO) together with the village 
committee, it did not include all the villagers. Overall, there was an attempt to provide 
villagers with the legal certainty of being able to access land and use natural resources 
through a certificate that enabled them to use land on a temporary basis with some 
restrictions depending on the case; but this has not yet been a success as villagers are still 
engaged in shifting cultivation, even though there has been an increase in security of 
tenure (Friederichsen R., Neef A., (2010)). In the case of the NPAs, there are still unclear 
institutional arrangements in terms of people’s rights to make decisions regarding NPA 
management, as some NPAs4 are supervised directly by the Ministry of Defense (MoD) 
with some technical assistance from the DFRM (MoNRE), due to these NPAs’ sensitive 
location. As a result, the NPA decree and management guidelines (NA, 2007) are not 
properly followed.  Some NPAs are actually designed for development that allows 
hydropower, mining and road projects5. Issues associated with these projects remain 
unsolved because, one, the current legal framework is not clear regarding the roles and 
                                                   
4Phou Khao Khouay and Phou Pha Nang NPAs are under the MoD, and some technical and conservation 
initiatives in the NPAs in Sai Phou Louang and along the Thai border (Nam Poui, Dong Khan Thoung) 
need to consult and receive the approval of the MoD. 
5 Nakai-Nam Theun NPA (hydropower and mining), Nam Et-Phou Loei (a road cutting through the core 
protection zone (tiger), Nam Kading NPA (hydropower), Xepiane NPA (road improvement and bauxite 
mining), Dong Hoa Sao NPA (encroachment of coffee and other rubber plantations), Dong Ampham NPA 
(rubber plantation concession). 
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rights of local institutions and communities in natural resources management, and, two, 
there is uneven law enforcement. 
 
This working paper introduces the drivers behind decentralization and some of the 
effects of initiatives that allocate rights to natural resources among users at the local level 
in Pathoumphone district, Champassack province. Pathoumphone district is about 48 km 
from Pakse, the main town of Champassack province. Its significant characteristic is its 
complex landscape, which is unlike other areas in remote rural Laos. This includes a rich 
diversity of forest and wetland ecosystems as well as some historical and cultural 
importance, together with a high degree of dependence on subsistence farming and 
fishing for local people’s livelihoods, and some trading.  Before the creation of the two 
local institutions in this district, there was some tension between the central and 
provincial government offices, on the one hand, and large international companies, on 
the other, in terms of decision-making processes on development projects, as well as 
conflicts over the use of the area’s natural resources. Rubber plantations, human 
settlement, agriculture expansion, the over-harvesting of forest products and, more 
recently, mining (peat land and bauxite), and road construction (Route 8B from 
Pathoumphone to Sanamxay district) across the Xepian national protected areas have 
caused considerable change to the forest and wetlands in this district due to the problem 
of their being unsustainable, as can be seen by the fragmentation of the forest and the 
large decline in some forest products, like rattan, cardamom and berberine, due to over 
harvesting for sale without a management system that is based on harvesting permits 
(IUCN, 2007). 
 
To address some of the pressures from this impact on the natural resources, the 
provincial and district authorities supported and approved the creation of the MJG and 
the DFWM.  As a result, the appearance of the areas in the district where the forests 
and wetlands are managed through the two local groups is remarkable.  The MJG has 
been continuing and replicating this work in other nearby villages without funding 
support since late 2009, and the DFWMT,6 together with village heads as members and 
the villagers, and with great support from the village cluster, continues to lead and take 
part in wetland management by following the agreements and regulations made within 
the village. It should be made clear that both institutional arrangements were the 
outcomes of the debate concerning the transfer of rights and power to local institutions, 
especially local communities like the Mak Jong management group.  
 
This paper also looks at how this fits into the current efforts of the Government of the 
Lao PDR in its “Sam Sang policy” or “three-build_Party decentralization”, which aims 
                                                   
6Some funding support for the DFWMT from the IUCN Mekong Water Dialogue (MWD) for some 
priority activities concerning the implementation of the Ramsar Convention, including the opportunity for 
dialogue within the DFWMT with villages and all the village clusters. 
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to build up villages as development units, create districts as strong integration units for 
planning in all its aspects, and establish provinces as strategic units. The Sam Sang 
policy has been implemented since October 2012, following the outcome of the 9th 
Party Assembly, and up to now 108 focal development villages in 51 districts,7 
including Vientiane, the capital, have been selected as pilot sites. Other relevant 
previous policies and strategies are also addressed in this paper.  
 




Pathoumphone district consists of rainfed lowland with flat land in the west, which is 
part of the Champassack plain and along the Mekong river, large wetlands (unique peat 
swamp habitat) to mountain forests in the east, and a large portion of two national 
protected areas (NPA) (Dong Hoa Sao in the north and Xepiane NPA in the south, 
22.42% and 52.79% of the total area, respectively), and provincial production forests.  
Pathoumphone district covers an area of 287,038 ha., and is composed of 8 village 
clusters (see Map 1) with 75 villages and a total population of 51,683 inhabitants, of 
which 26,358 are females (NAFRI, 2007).  
 
  
        Map 1: Administrative map and land use and forest cover,  
                     Pathoumphone District, NAFRI (2007) 
 
Mak Jong (MJ) (Scapium Macropodium – the family of Sterculiacae) is a unique 
species that is important for the local economy as it is used as a traditional Chinese 
medicine for sore throats and in drinks and desserts for local consumption. In the Lao 
PDR, the species is only found in three districts of Southern Laos (Pathoumphone (30 
                                                   
7 KPL Lao New Agency http://www.kpl.net.la/english/news/newsrecord/2013/Feb/04.2.2013/edn1.htm 
1. Lak 19 village cluster 
2. Mouang village cluster 
3. Done Deng village cluster 
4. Pathoumphone village 
cluster 
5. Boun village cluster 
6. Sanote village cluster 
7. Saming village cluster 
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villages), Khong district of Champassack (7 villages), and Sanamxay district of Attapeu 
province (10 villages)) and in districts in Sekong or Saravane. MJ can also be found in 
Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia (IUCN, 2008). Issues associated with MJ are related 
to competitive harvesting as evidenced by the large number of Mak Jong trees being cut 
down (2000 trees in 2008)8, immature fruit collection, an uncontrolled system of harvest 
permits that was put in place for both locals and outsiders, and an insecure system 
within the district for monitoring the trade in MJ at a fair price.  
 
The Bung Kiat Ngong (BKN) wetland in Pathoumphone district has been one of two 
Ramsar sites established since the Lao PDR acceded to the Convention on Wetlands in 
2010. It is composed of different wetland types, including swamps, lakes, peat land, 
marshes, and forests on the edge of the wetland, together with the cultural and historical 
site of Phou Asa. This wetland is home to a rich biodiversity of fish and aquatic plants 
that local people have used to maintain their livelihoods. Currently, the Siamese 
crocodile and the water bird population – the area is a migration point for the Sarus 
crane – are under pressure (IUCN, 2003). The main issues related to BKN wetland 
management are conflicts over the use of the resources of the wetland among the local 
communities (e.g. over-fishing, the ownership of the natural fishponds (holes), and the 
expansion of paddy fields into the wetlands) and with outsiders (peat land extraction, 
burning grasses to allow for fishing, and illegal fishing). The local authorities found that 
these issues occurred because there was a lack of clear responsibility among the 
institutions responsible for the management of the wetlands, a lack of coordination 
between different sectors and stakeholders, and a high degree of competition when 
designing initiatives and developments for the site.   
 
In this case study, two local institutions from the IUCN project have been selected: the 
Livelihood and Landscape Strategy Project (LLS) and the Mekong Water Dialogue 
Project (MWD). These were established in the same district. There are 11 villages under 
the MJG, which was set up in 2008 on the basis of the interests of the villages in the 
areas MJ covered (Pathoumphone, 2008), and there were 12 villages under the DFWM 
in 2011 (all villages inside the Ramsar boundary). Three villages are involved in both 
institutions - Ban Kiat Ngong, Ban Sanote and Ban Thopsok (see Table 1). The MJG 
covers 3 village clusters (most of the villages are from the Sanote and Nam Om village 
clusters; there is only 1 village in the Pathoumphone village cluster) with a total 
population of about 6,370 inhabitants, while the DFWM covers 3 village clusters 
(Sanote, Phapho and Saming) with a total population of 10,367 inhabitants (see Table 2). 
4 villages in the Sanote and Saming village clusters do not have a direct boundary with the 
Ramsar site.  
                                                   
8 This figure was reported by the Vice District Governor during a meeting on the number of MJ trees cut 
down each year. 
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Table 1: Composition of villages, village clusters and the population of the MJG, Pathoumphone district  
(update from IUCN, 2009 and SUFORD, 2009) 
Village name Village cluster MJG 






Ban Kiat Ngong Sanote 158 960 1,550 Included in DFWMT 
Ban Tha Hou               Sanote 85 467     25  
Ban Houay Ko Sanote 30  165     40  
Ban Thong Pha Sanote 107 611    840  
Ban Sanote Sanote 126 689    234 Included in DFWMT 
Ban Thopsok Sanote 83 541    100 Included in DFWMT 
  589 3,433 2,789  
Ban Nam Om Nam Om 153 802    420  
Ban Nabone Nam Om 96 489 3,200  
Ban Somsouk Nam Om 98 420 3,630  
Ban Lao Nha Nam Om 99 591    208  
  446 2,302 7,458  
Ban Na Kok Pathoumphone 108 635    130  
  108 635 130  
Total  1,143 6,370 10,377  
Note: 3 villages are in both the MJG and the DFWMT 
 
Table 2: Composition of villages, village clusters and the population of the DFWM, Pathoumphone 
district (update from IUCN, 2009) 
Village name Village 
cluster 
DFWMT 






Ban Kiat Ngong Sanote 158 960   
Ban Sanote Sanote 126 689  No direct boundary 
Ban Thopsok Sanote 83 541   
Ban Phommaleuk Sanote 128 680   
Ban Nathong Sanote 102 522  No direct boundary 
  597 3,392   
Ban Pahlay Phapho 309 1,427   
Ban Phapho Phapho 339 1,628   
Ban Phakkha Phapho 124 778   
Ban Nong Mak Ek Phapho 100 658   
  872 4,491   
Ban Kaelae Saming 151 952   
Ban Saming  Saming 173 1,124  No direct boundary 
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Ban Thongxay Saming 79 408  No direct boundary 
  403 2,484   
Total  1,872 10,367 3,264.94  
Note: 4 villages under the DFWMT do not have a direct boundary with the Ramsar site but they have the 
right to be included on the basis of traditional practice. 
2.2  Study Framework 
Figure 1 below indicates the basic flow of the analysis of the case study. This includes 
the process that was involved in the establishment of the institutions, the legal 
framework, and the impact of the two institutions on the decentralization regarding the 
natural resources of the area. This is based on a review of the literature, the author’s 
engagement in the project’s implementation, and observations based on the village 
cluster and district’s notes during their meetings and discussions with various 
stakeholders. 
 
The analysis looks at the changes that are based on the framework principles in the 
institutional arrangements after the groups’ creation and the implications these changes 
had for management practice, together with the possible linkages that they had to the 
ecological (forest and wetland) situation and people’s livelihoods (see Figure 1). The 
framework applied to the case study (Karauchi et al. 2008) included (1) rights to 
decision-making - to assess how local groups have power over the resources necessary 
to implement, enforce and manage conflict, (2) accountability - how the local groups 
influence decision-makers so that they are responsive to the rights and needs of the local 
groups, and how they support law enforcement, and (3) the capacity of the local 
institutional groups - their ability to implement and maintain their power and rights 
regarding the natural resources in the area.  
 
In relation to the Pathoumphone case study, accountability and the capacity to deal with 
natural resources management are equally important and are inter-related. However, in 
order to get local people to be active participants, accountability is the first priority. This 
requires a transparent and effective mechanism that is associated with a sharing of the 
profits raised from the revenue that accrues from people’s management of the natural 
resources in the area. In addition, the issue of local institutions’ and individuals’ 
capacity is a prerequisite for the success of decentralization, as this helps people to 
follow through on their accountability and implement decisions, taking their local 
knowledge and capacity in the area into account. On the other hand, the rights to 
decision-making regarding natural resources are still new, and it is beyond the capacity 
of local authorities and individuals at present to implement and enforce their decisions, 
as such implementation and enforcement currently follows rules laid out by a traditional 
hierarchy and traditional practice. Therefore, a clear institutional arrangement and legal 
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framework are needed to support local decisions and allow people to fulfill their roles 
and meet their responsibilities.  
 




3. Process of Institutional Establishment and the Legal Framework 
 
3.1 Issues related to the creation of the two local institutions 
The institutional arrangement of the two management groups was mostly established 
and applied on the basis of the existing administrative divisions in the Laos PDR, i.e. 
the four levels of the province, the district, the village cluster, and the village. However, 
some of the roles and mandates for each group are based on regulations and agreements 
reached within the village, and between villages in the same village cluster. The village 
cluster9 was selected by the village heads within the cluster to provide support to 
village members. The district authority has an oversight role in the implementation of 
both the institutions and various projects, including supporting the groups’ formation, 
agreements, regulations, the adoption of their work plans, and monitoring their progress. 
 
There are some differences regarding roles and mandates between the MJG 
(Pathoumphone, 2008; and 2009) and the DFWM (Pathoumphone, 2010).  In the MJG, 
each village has formed its MJG team, which is composed of four units: conflict 
resolution, monitoring, administration, and finance, with trading groups being optional 
(see Figure 2).  About 89 percent of the households in all 11 villages are MJG 
members. Each MJG village has to report to its village cluster, especially during the 
monthly meeting, in addition to making reports as part of its routine reporting system. 
The provincial authority was assigned to the District Authority to lead the MJG directly. 
The district governor or his deputy has a direct oversight role with respect to all three 
village clusters, which he or she carries out with the support of the district technical 
                                                   
9 Village clusters were created in 2004 based on the 2001 Guidelines by the Committee for Planning and 
Cooperation. They act as ad-hoc administrative bodies and do not have full official functions as teams or 
offices like the Taseng before (or the sub-district) 
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team. This shows the positive impact and influence of the transfer of power to the 
district authority, the MJG, the village cluster,10 and the villages. 
 
The DFWM was officially formed as an operational unit for the management of the 
Ramsar site. Representatives of the three village clusters are included in the DFWM, 
although there is no direct representation from the villages themselves (see Figure 3). 
The DFWM worked with all 12 villages through the village clusters on the 
implementation of the Ramsar Convention. In addition, the DFWM has other reporting 
lines, such as to the Provincial Steering Committee and the National Ramsar Secretariat 
(central level), which serves as the secretary for the National Ramsar Steering 















                                                   
10 For the MJG at the village level, the village cluster heads are key to the functioning of the MJG (see 
Fig. 2) in its work with its members. 
1. MJ areas of Ban Kiat Ngong  
2.  MJ areas of Ban Tha Hou  
3.  MJ areas of Ban Houay Ko  
4.  MJ areas of Ban Thong Pha   
5.  MJ areas of Ban Nam Om  
6.  MJ areas of Ban Nabone 
7.  MJ areas of Ban Somsouk 
8.  MJ areas of Ban Thopsok 
9.  MJ areas of Ban Na Kok 
10. MJ areas of Ban Sanot   









Sanote village cluster: 688 hhs 
(4,024), size allocation 2,789 ha. 
Nam Om village cluster: 347 hhs 
(1,711), size allocation - 7,458 ha. 
 
Pathoumphone village cluster- 
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Map 3: Boundary of 12 villages in the Ramsar site, Pathoumphone district 
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Figure 3: Organisational chart of the DFWM in Pathoumphone district 
 


























2.2  Institutional arrangements for managing the forest and wetland resources in 
Pathoumphone District 
This section reviews the key policy instruments related to both the forests and wetlands 
and the regulations for the two local groups in Pathoumphone district.  The focus is 
only on some of the most recent and influential aspects, and is based on notes from 
discussions and debates at various events and meetings.  
 
2.2.1 The Mak Jong community-based management group (MJG): 
 
In 2008, IUCN Lao, an organization working on the Livelihood and Landscape Project 
PONRE PAFO Prov. Office Women  Prov. Office 
Culture& 
Tourism 
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with the district authority, made an effort to develop the multi-village MJ Group (11 
villages with MJ in and near their settlement that was managed according to traditional 
practice) with the objective of enhancing local institutions to protect the forest through 
sustainable harvesting with income generation for the villagers, the village authority and 
the district. The total area of forest that was allocated to the MJG villages covers about 
10,377 ha. (see Map 2).11 In this area there are about mature 689 mature MJ trees and 
about 500 young MJ trees, which are expected to be able to be harvested for a period of 
3 years (Survey 2009). This information about the young MJ trees indicates that 
expansion plans for the MJ forest and forest connectivity can naturally be rehabilitated 
if there is enough collaboration with the MJG. 
 
In the MJG, there are two regulations. The first concerns the management of the 
collection and purchase of key NTFPs, including MJ, berberine, cardamom and wild 
honey (Pathoumphone, 2008).12 The second is an amendment or an addition that is 
specific to MJ (Pathoumphone, 2009). Under forest law (NA, 2007) and wildlife law 
(NA, 2007b), all villagers are allowed to collect all NTFPs for their own consumption, 
but not for commercial purpose.  The collection of MJ is an exceptional case, due to 
the trade that follows the harvesting of its fruits. There is evidence of MJ trees being cut 
down just for their fruit as a result of the severe competition that exists among the 
villagers during the harvest time, and market demand. Therefore, a local management 
group needed to be created, together with a management system, in order to ensure a 
sustainable income, and the sharing of benefits and profits among the villagers.   
 
In practice, both MJ regulations follow the forest and wildlife protection laws (including 
customary law and traditional practice) as can be seen in the rights granted to all to 
collect forest products in a sustainable manner. Local agreements were prepared by the 
local authorities, which allowed the people involved to obtain a better understanding of 
their roles and mandates and put them into practice. This included the formation of 
teams for the forest allocation survey, a sub-village monitoring group, participation in 
various surveys that drew on people’s local knowledge, collective agreements on the 
timeline for the harvest so that people could gather good, mature products by informing 
group members and outsiders about joining the harvest in an appropriate manner, the 
monitoring of illegal practices before and during the harvest, and the establishment of a 
trading system to monitor traders, inform people about prices and reach agreements 
with the MJG to ensure that the revenue was collected as agreed and then shared among 
the different units as a reward for their efforts in managing the forest. 
 
                                                   
11 Pathoumphone district, 2008: Mak Jong Survey Report, the Livelihood and 
Landscape Strategy Project (LLS), supported by IUCN and PAFO 
12 Both MJ regulations (2008 and 2009), only available in Lao, were prepared by the 
MJG villages and approved by the District and Provincial Governor of Champassack 
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In the amendment or additional regulation, which was specific to the MJG, the village 
trade sub-group was included so that it could support the MJG at the village level to 
record the quantities of drying MJ of each grade for each household and individual, 
contact traders on prices, prepare trading agreements, and then distribute revenues to 
different members and units as per the agreement. In this regulation, outsiders can join 
the harvest after registering and agreeing to sell their MJ to the village trading unit, 
which charges a small fee on behalf of the MJG.  Each individual collector can keep 
some MJ for their own consumption (3 to 5 kgs. each time).  All traders and 
middleman can only purchase MJ from the village trading unit after an agreement has 
been made with the MJG, after which they can then get a paper for their transportation 
from the MJG or village authority upon a payment that includes any additional fees for 
the MJG.  The village trading unit needs to inform their members regularly about the 
MJ price given by the traders, uses a proper scale and reports to members each time it 
sells MJ. 
 
Each village holds a certain amount of funds as a village development fund (VDF), the 
use of which depends on the decision of the village head and the village committee. In 
the case of Somsouk village in 2009, the village authority decided to use the VDF to 
give poor households an advance during the early harvesting period so that they were 
willing to go through the proper procedure in order that they could obtain a better price. 
During that time, many villages did not make this decision as they were afraid of the 
risks, or it was beyond their authority to make such a decision.  
 
Overall, the MJG works well. Villagers appreciate the benefits of the forest allocation 
concerning the management of their affairs, and they are very active and responsive to 
the mandates and responsibilities that have been assigned to them under the regulations 
and agreements that have been approved both among the villagers, and with other 
villages in the same village cluster. Once the allocated MJ forest areas have been 
protected and managed sustainably, the ecosystem of the MJ forest has improved, and 
this has also affected the surrounding forest. 
 
2.2.2 The District Field Wetland Management team (DFWM): 
 
The DFWM was officially established after the Lao PDR ratified the Ramsar 
Convention.  The DFWM is composed of representatives from different sectors at the 
district level (see Figure 3), including representatives from 3 village clusters. The 
village clusters play an important role on behalf of their villages in protecting villages’ 
interests. The Ramsar site regulation13 was prepared through a participatory process of 
                                                   
13The Ramsar regulation was managed by the DFWMT with all 12 villages and approved by the 
Champasack governer 
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discussions, and it was agreed among 12 villages from 3 village clusters, 4 of which do 
not have a boundary with the Ramsar site but are included due to customary practice 
regarding the use of these wetlands. Overall, the regulation provides conditions for the 
utilization of the wetlands not only for the 12 Ramsar villages but also for outside 
villages. This is due to the connectivity of the large wetland area.  
 
In principle, local villagers in the Ramsar site have agreed to identify three protected 
zones of about 265.5 ha. as strict conservation zones (see Map 3), 8 small areas as 
seasonal zones (14.5 ha.), and two sites of 4.7 ha. as conservation areas with a specific 
conservation focus (Champassack, 2010).  The three protected zones cover about 
8.51% of the total area, and the remaining areas have been identified in the Ramsar 
settlement as customary management zones for villages to attain sustainability under the 
concept of ‘wise use.’  The participatory approach of the Ramsar regulation was 
mostly based on people’s local knowledge, especially regarding the strict and seasonal 
zones. 
 
In the regulation, there is a restriction on any conversion of the land or forest in the 
Ramsar site under Article 6. The DFWM found it quite difficult to enforce the law due 
to its unclear role and also because it was beyond their authority in terms of their 
development activities, particularly with regard to peat extraction and other concessions.  
With respect to specific wetlands and the Ramsar site, there is an unclear institutional 
arrangement regarding responsibilities for management and law enforcement, although 
such arrangements are specified in other laws and regulations (NA, 1996; NA, 2003; 
NA, 2007a, NA, 2007b).  
 
In Part VII of the regulation, local villagers are allowed to use the natural resources in 
the area for consumption, e.g. regarding NTFP collection. Timber use is allowed in the 
management zone if a handsaw is used, but one needs to get permission from the 
authorities concerned. The situation is similar in the case of the customary zones. 
Villagers are also allowed to harvest NTFPs and timber in a sustainable way if a request 
is made by an individual or a village and then approved by the authorities concerned.  
Thus, there are some concerns on the part of both the local authorities and the villagers 
concerning the system or criteria for approval with regard to local consumption in terms 
of quantities and people’s ability to control NTFPs and timber harvesting for household 
use in the management and customary zones. In relation to the approval process, 
authorities are still unclear about what rights they have and what quantities are attached 
to those rights.  
 
Local authorities at both the provincial and district levels agreed on the current Ramsar 
site boundary, but there are some concerns about the location of many villages in the 
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large wetland connected to the BKN Ramsar site. Therefore there is a need to consider 
some villages as buffer zone villages, and include them and other villages in an 
educational awareness program on the wetland, the Ramsar convention and the site’s 
management. 
2.2.3 Issues debated under arrangements within the institutional and legal framework 
The Mak Jong multi-village management group (MJG) 
 
During the early stage of the establishment of the MJ multi-village management group, 
it was difficult to get several officials and individuals to agree and approve support for 
the creation of the MJG.  The project team was discussed in work with village heads 
and the village clusters, then the authorities led the process during further discussions 
with the District Authority.  The issues of concern were the allocation of forest land to 
the villages for them to manage, as the villagers always referred to the fact that local 
groups have insufficient and limited roles and mandates regarding the overall 
development and administration of the forest product management group. This 
argument was solved due to pressure arising from the great decline in the number of MJ 
trees in the area as a result of the severe competition during the harvesting of the fruit 
within the village, and with other villages and outsiders who also have the right to 
collect NTFPs, together with the issue of the lack of local people’s responsibility or 
ownership when it came to the harvesting of MJ and other NTFPs. 
 
Allocation of the forest: 
Even though the MJG has been allocated rights to the forest, as they can harvest MJ 
fruits and receive fees as revenue for the village, the village cluster and the district, and 
it is very active in undertaking its responsibilities, such as monitoring, patrolling, and 
participating in various surveys and rehabilitation plans for the MJ forests, they still feel 
insecure about the future of the forest as the transfer of power is incomplete.  Some 
concerns raised by the representatives of the MJG of Nam Om and Thong Pha villages 
relate to applying or expanding MJG practice to include other forest products, such as 
looking to rehabilitate the natural forest through berberine, rattan, Nhang trees for resin 
(the Dipterocarpus species), and wild honey.  Villagers have made efforts to protect the 
forest, starting with MJ as one species, but it is also worthwhile for them to derive more 
benefits. In this way, the forests will be protected.   
 MJG members mentioned that the forests near the allocated forests can be 
rehabilitated (including MJ and other NTFPs) by using their local knowledge 
(natural rehabilitation) and through collaboration among the relevant villages; 
however, this also needs long-term MJG viability together with a legal 
framework.  
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Outside villagers joining the MJ fruit harvest, following customary practice and the 
Forestry Law: 
Following the MJG agreement, outsiders can participate in the MJ harvest after 
receiving information about the schedule for the harvest. They are happy to go through 
the agreed process to register with the village committee, pay some fees and sell all their 
MJ fruits to that particular village.  However it is still quite difficult for the MJG to 
fully follow or monitor outsiders concerning the fees they need to pay, in part because 
of the issue of MJ's long-term viability.  Recently, some villagers have reported that 
some outsiders went to collect MJ in other non-MJG villages, and this affects the 
agreement, the regulation and the efforts of the MJG when it comes to managing their 
forest in the future.  
 The Sanote village cluster recommended expanding the network - to share more 
information and knowledge, to improve conflict management and disseminate 
information more widely to other non-MJG villages. They would like to upgrade 
the MJG into an MJ or an NTFPs Association to achieve a proper profile and 
status for negotiating and networking with the private sector so that they can 
engage in sustainable and long-term trade with NTFPs.  
 
MJ trading and the link to fee collection and its future for sustainable financing: 
 
Even though traders and middlemen can participate and buy MJ if they follow the 
regulation, they are required to follow a procedure, including making a request and 
agreeing on a price with the local authorities and the MJG before they can enter into an 
agreement with the MJG.  The MJG or village trade unit will then provide an official 
permit for transportation.  However, some MJG members still complained that some of 
the traders that had been selected by the district authority and province did not follow 
the regulations properly. This affects the revenue of the village, the village cluster and 
the district. 
 Villagers asked the district and the province to talk with traders about following 
the system and supporting the MJ procedures for income generation. 
 
The District Field Wetland Management team (DFWM) 
 
Overall, the regulation for the Ramsar site management was created using a 
participatory approach, and was endorsed by all the villages as the Ramsar site 
settlement.  This legal instrument was also based on other laws and regulations, 
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especially customary practice.  However, the policies and regulatory framework were 
soon discovered to be insufficient. For instance, there was an unclear institutional 
arrangement for the wetland (not Ramsar), from the central to the local level, and for the 
linkage to the implementation of the Ramsar Convention. There was also no clear 
framework for public consultation, especially for decision-making on concessions and 
the large scale infrastructure related to the Ramsar site and its surrounding forests. 
Relationship between the agreement and customary practice: 
According to my observations, and based on discussions with the village authority and 
the villagers, the villagers appreciated having this regulation so that they could reach an 
agreement on the areas that were to be allocated to each village, especially when it came 
to solving conflicts between the villages over fishing during the dry season.  However, 
the issues with outside villagers on fishing during the wet season remain unsolved due 
to the lack of boundaries, especially for the strict and seasonal zones, as most people 
still follow customary law, which allows them to fish in the flooded areas and leave 
their cattle in the wetlands. 
 The BKN village head raised his concern over the strict and seasonal zones 
during the rainy season. There is a need to put a specific mark on the ground for 
protection, to establish the seasonal zones (breeding season), to put up boards at 
important places with an explanation to improve people’s understanding, and to 
monitor and patrol. In addition, the Sanote village cluster recommended that 
the district authority and the DFWMT disseminate the Ramsar regulation to all 
nearby villages. 
 
Village boundaries between Bueng Kiat Ngong and the other villages: 
There has been an argument between Ban Kiat Ngong (a big. old village in terms of its 
area and population) and other small villages around BKN after the allocation of forest 
land in 1992, as this allocation was conducted in consultation mainly with BKN.  
Since that time, a large portion of the wetlands has been allocated to BKN, and BKN’s 
villagers have started to stake their claim and ownership over the wetlands by tightening 
their rights to block other surrounding villages from fishing and growing rice on the 
edge of the wetland near their village (this is especially so for Phommaleuk). There has 
been a lot of stress and tension between BKN and other villages as the LU allocation 
was officially approved by the district but it did not fully accord with the rights flowing 
from customary practice, for instance, on the issue of stealing fish from fish holes 
during the dry season, burning grass in the wetlands for new pasture, fishing in the deep 
pool, as had been agreed. These conflicts continued during the pre-accession 
preparatory process for the Ramsar Convention, especially regarding the review of the 
boundaries, the new agreements on village boundaries and the Ramsar boundary.  At 
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the same time, the village cluster had already been established and there was a great 
opportunity to get the villagers to manage these conflicts through the village cluster’s 
meetings. This was summarized by the issues that were debated in the various meetings 
before and during the recent boundary demarcation. 
 All three village clusters of the DFWMT mentioned the need to reconsider the 
boundary of the Ramsar site as some key villages may need to be included in a 
buffer zone, and to include representatives of non-Ramsar sites in the site’s 
management, in educational campaigns and in consciousness-raising. The 
reasons are due to the Ramsar site connectivity to the larger wetland area and 
also to avoid any negative impact from use of the wetlands outside the Ramsar 
site.  
 
Peat excavation carried out by a private company 
Peat was extracted in 2006 by a Vietnamese company for use as an organic fertilizer for 
its rubber plantation in the province. Some of the peat extracted was also sold by the 
company (IUCN, 2011). The concession for the peat land was granted by the province.  
The excavated areas were not rehabilitated, and several large, invisible holes were left 
in the northern part of BKN (Ramsar site). This was judged to be caused by the 
development, and it had a negative effect on the villagers’ cattle. Villagers from Ban 
Kiat Ngong, other villagers, the village cluster and the district were unhappy because 
not enough information was shared, and the profits from the peat had not been 
distributed fairly with the locals. They were also aware of the effects of the peat 
excavation on the change in the water tables. As the peat concession is still valid along 
the terms agreed to and granted by the province, the company wanted to continue with 
the extraction. The villagers reported this to the line authorities since they were aware of 
the company’s preparations to excavate in 2011 on the Ramsar site, and the extraction 
was then halted due to influence exerted by the village cluster and the District 
Committee. 
Provincial plan for the construction of a flood gate  
 
The construction of a flood gate was included in the Provincial Agriculture and Forestry 
Office’s plan a long time ago. This was linked to the purpose of releasing flood water 
during the rainy season, and to the creation of more rice fields during the dry season. 
BKN villagers raised their concerns about this project as they thought that it might 
change the ecosystem of the wetlands or have a negative effect on their rights to use the 
land. Based on BKN’s concerns, the district authority then proposed that the province 
conduct an economic assessment before building the gate.   
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4. Outcomes of the analysis of decentralization after the creation of the two local 
groups in Pathoumphone 
Since the creation of the two local institutions in Pathoumphone, the key outcomes of 
the analysis that have been identified as important, non-cash, immaterial benefits 
resulting from the decentralization regarding the area’s natural resources, were 
highlighted under the study framework as follows.  
 
4.1 Mak Jong multi-village management group (MJG): 
 
The MJG at the village level not only played a significant role in managing the 
allocation of the forest for the MJ harvest. They were also aware of the current status 
and values of other key NTFPs in their areas of responsibility, even though the current 
arrangement is only for MJ fruits, a seasonal income generator.  
 
Effectiveness:  MJG enhanced their organizational capacity, and the villagers became 
more confident in dealing with issues within their village, and with other villages, the 
village cluster and traders. This included improvements that became apparent in better 
coordination and collaboration. The villagers appreciated being MJG members, as they 
now had clear boundaries that clarified their responsibility to monitor and patrol the 
area. This is evident in the fact that there is no evidence of MJ trees being cut down in 
the forests since 2008, as well as in the villagers’ increasing desire to share 
responsibility. 
 
MJG appreciated the support and close supervision of both the village cluster 
and the district, but it also needs, one, a link or network with 
high-decision-makers for feedback and support to up-grade MJG  practices and 
achievements, and, two, support with both law enforcement and the group’s 
links with the private sector. 
 
Responsiveness: Through a series of educational, consciousness-raising and outreach 
programs, MJG members became more active in managing their forests, strictly 
followed regulations and systems of penalties, as can be seen in their regular reports on 
individual cases and conflict management, and paid more attention to protecting other 
NTFPs. 
 
Nam Om village and BKN heads mentioned that there is a need to have a strong 
link with the national protected area’s management and tourism team for more 
collaboration on increasing awareness and outreach programs for the MJG and 
other non-MJG villages in order to replicate this experience and build strong 
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co-management of the NPA.  
 
Participation: Beside the formation of the MJ village units and the preparation of the 
regulation and other agreements, villagers were active in providing support to the 
surveys and forest allocation activities by using their traditional knowledge and 
conducting strict patrols on the basis of their agreements. Some concerns over land 
concessions and other initiatives that occurred in their areas were discussed during the 
village cluster’s meetings. 
 
BKN Villagers and the Sanote village cluster head asked the district to establish 
a proper system to share or disseminate the outcomes of all surveys and 
activities to increase their understanding and improve future participation. Some 
women’s representatives expressed concern about their request to the MJG to 
create added value through MJ processed products. Therefore, there is a need to 
include women’s representation at the MJG management level. 
 
Local revenue maximization: The capacity of the local authority and the villagers was 
increased, as they were able to debate processing and trade to get more income for the 
local villagers and the authority. Figure 4 shows the inter-relationship between the 
different units in the MJG at the village level, and with other levels, like other MJG 
villages, the village cluster, the district and the traders.  
 
In addition, the MJG at Somsouk village in the Nam Om village cluster decided to set 
up a village trading unit in 2009 to encourage villagers to add value to their products 
before selling by, for example, drying, grading, packaging and negotiating the price for 
different grades with the traders. They also made the decision to use the village 
development fund to provide loans to poor villagers to take part in the processing and 
thus get more income. The results showed that MJG Somsouk village earned more 
income (nearly four times that of the village development fund that they had used over 5 
weeks14), and they were then able to share the benefits among MJG members, the 
village units, the village authority, the village development fund, the village cluster, and 
the district.  This was replicated by other villages after the MJG disseminated 
information to other MJG villages (IUCN, 2009). However, there was not a unanimous 
agreement on the sharing of the benefits, as the majority of MJG members asked for an 
equal share from the large profits, which was not agreed by a minority of members, 
especially by the monitoring team. However, it was agreed by the majority and then 
approved by the district authority. 
 
                                                   
14 They used 16 million Kips of their village development fund and received pure profits of 67 million 
Kips during the 5 week period) - see the meeting report of the MJG meeting from the LLS project (2009) 
– link to the IUCN website. 
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One interesting result was that women in the MJG asked how they could learn how to 
make MJ juice and tea bags15 to add value to the MJ fruits and increase their skills. In 
response to their request, the project provided a training and exchange study tour to 
Uborn in Thailand, where they were able to prepare MJ juice for several provincial and 
district events. However, adding value to MJ final products has not happened due to a 
lack of interest and investment by the private sector and support from both the district 
and provincial authorities. 
 
The Ban Somsouk village head raised his concern about their rights over the use 
of the village development fund and in dealing with traders and middlemen as 
their roles remained unclear and they had not  received full support from the 
district for many reasons.  
 
 
Figure 4: MJG functions at the village level with its link to the processing process,  
collection of fees and sharing of revenues within the MJG, with the village cluster and with the 
district 
 
4.2 The District Field Wetland Management team (DFWM): 
 
The Provincial Ramsar Steering Committee (PRSC), an upper level and direct line 
supervisor of the District Field Wetland Management Team (DFWM) played a 
significant role not only in developing mechanisms for the institutional set-up at the 
level of the district and the village clusters, but also in communicating with central 
                                                   
15 They became aware of MJ finished products from Uborn in Thailand while arrangements were being 
made for the LLS study tour.  
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authorities like the secretariat of the National Ramsar committee, which serves as the 
main office of the Ramsar Convention in the Lao PDR and provides a direct link and 
line of reporting to the Ramsar Secretariat Office. This process has been on-going and 
evolving since the PRSC was officially nominated in 2011. After BKN was ratified as a 
Ramsar site, its profile increased and more tourists visited, and there was increased 
income from fishing due to DFWM’s zone management and conflict management. 
 
Effectiveness: Villagers strongly supported the preparation of the regulation for the 
Ramsar site. They took ownership of their wetlands as identified under different zones 
with specific objectives under the concept of “wise use purpose”.  They actively 
discussed the wetland boundaries for each village as is indicated by the debates over the 
boundary demarcation for the Ramsar site. Local villagers (Phommaleuk village and 
other small villages near BKN) claimed their customary rights over their village 
boundaries with BKN (a large village) after the allocation of forest land in 1992.  Since 
the setting up of the DFWM, the boundary conflicts between the villages have been 
resolved, particularly with respect to the stealing of fish from the fish holes during the 
dry season, and the villages have respected the regulation and the agreements. One 
successful outcome from people’s participation during the preparation for the regulation, 
was the villagers’ agreement on the daily fish catch and the size of the fish that could be 
caught. This was an agreement that was followed by most of the villagers. 
 
Village heads mentioned that they are not included in the DFWM, and that they 
need to have regular discussions on the Ramsar regulation and other relevant 
policies and laws through meetings, training or special events to refresh and 
increase their understanding and competence.  
 
Responsiveness:  Villagers reported to the village clusters on unsound and illegal 
practices and on anything that might impact the wetland for further discussion with the 
aim of finding a solution to the problem. Recently, they raised their concerns over the 
peat extraction and reported on these to the line authorities. The extraction was stopped 
because of the reaction of the local villagers on the Ramsar site. They were also 
concerned about the protected and seasonal zones during the rainy season, as these were 
quite difficult to control and monitor because fishing is an open-access activity which is 
based on customary rights and does not follow the boundaries that have been delineated 
for these zones (Pathoumphone, 2010). In relation to the expansion of the rice fields, 
villagers raised their concerns about the design for a new ditch to block or drain the 
water. This required the authorities concerned to carefully prepare a proper design for 
the ditch and engage in a process of consultation. 
The DFWMT raised their concerns on the need for transparency and public 
participation in any initiatives related to the Ramsar site during their official 
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meetings with the Provincial and National Ramsar Steering Committees, as can 
be seen in their increased demands to be able to use the land, forests and wetland 
for other purposes. 
 
Participation:  The local authority and villagers participated in all activities and 
initiatives related to the protection of the wetlands and the rehabilitation and 
improvement of their livelihoods, including, one, actively engaging in village cluster 
meetings to report any incidents and, two, restoring the wetlands by replanting aquatic 
plants16 (Kok Seng).  
 
In order to have active local participation in the implementation of the Ramsar 
Convention, representatives from all the villages should be DFWM members, 
and other relevant surrounding villages should also be added and their 
participation encouraged 17  (or at least they should be involved in the 
educational awareness program) in order that their understanding be improved 
and that there should be no negative impact on the Ramsar site. 
 
Local revenue maximization: Tourism is one source of income for villagers in the BKN 
wetlands, however current tourism activities were not distributed widely among the 
communities due to a limited number of households having elephants or being engaged 
in homestays. This requires further integration and better collaboration with tourism 
operators, the national protection areas (MoNRE, 2012), and support from the district. 
The women’s group recognized the value of the wetlands in their area and were 
concerned about the expansion of the rice fields and the use of chemical fertilizers. 
Therefore, they asked for funds so that an investment could be made in making organic 
fertilizer and growing organic vegetables as these would bring in more income for local 
groups in the Ramsar site.   
 
The district authority realized the need, one, to link with the private sector, small 
scale entrepreneurs and other sectors like the tourism sector and the NPA to 
achieve sustainable financing in wetland management, and, two, to increase 
local institutional capacity in these areas. 
 
To sum up, the kind of decentralisation regarding natural resources that is described in 
this case study can lead to an increase in the efficiency of local authorities and 
communities. In particular, local participation lends most to the process as people are 
then aware of their priorities and needs, and they can define the services that reflect 
                                                   
16 Kok seng is a local aquatic plant, its leaves and branches can be used for hiding fishing holes during 
the dry season and birds’ nests. 
17 This was raised by the BKN village head with the DFWMT in the village cluster meeting on the final 
agreement on the Ramsar boundary. 
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their needs in their programs and plans, and through this process they can utilize limited 
resources and maximize revenue. The analysis of the impact of decentralization 
regarding natural resources on the two local institutions could not make a clear 
comparison between the two institutions due to the short timeline and the lack of time 
for an in-depth assessment study on decision-making, accountability and capacity. 
However, there was some success in terms of decentralization regarding natural 
resources as driven by the NEM process and local requests for long-term sustainable 
forest and wetland management.   
 
Rights to decision-making: The MJG is aware of their rights based on their mandates, 
but they are not completely confident, because they always have to consult the village 
cluster both because the cluster is their direct line supervisor and for support.  It was 
discovered that the MJG felt that there were limitations and not enough information was 
being shared at the district and provincial levels. As mentioned earlier, the DFWM is 
mostly composed of government officials and there is direct supervision from the 
district. This makes it a bit different from the MJG. However, the engagement of the 
village heads in the decision-making process was found to be quite limited, as also 
mentioned earlier, because they are not included in the DFWM as members. Overall, the 
village clusters played an important role as they used monthly meetings with the district 
and the province to support both local institutions. 
Since there are overlapping responsibilities in the multiple agencies involved at 
the local level, and limited inter-agency coordination (at the provincial level), 
both local institutions’ members were concerned with their rights when dealing 
with law enforcement (especially regarding illegal activities) and regarding the 
issue of the mechanism for sharing information and decision-making regarding 
development in their areas.  
 
Accountability: The MJG played their role as they organized a regular monthly meeting 
with different village units and villagers as members before the village cluster meeting 
on the issues and conflicts related to the MJG in their areas. With support from the 
village cluster, they also played a role in negotiating with middlemen and the private 
sector for a fair price and in supporting the village trading unit to set up mechanisms 
related to MJ trading at the village level. The DFWM and village authorities were 
actively engaged in the series of events related to the Ramsar pre-accession process and 
other processes during implementation (preparation of the Ramsar regulation, the 
management plan, meetings, the launch of the Ramsar site, and the celebration of World 
Wetlands Day). Villagers in the Ramsar site informed their line authorities on anything 
that might impact the site. 
The MJG members (Ban Nam Om and Thopsok) were uncertain as to the future 
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of the MJ management group due to the legal status of the MJG as can be seen 
from the fact that some decisions on forest and land conversion for other 
purposes were made by the province and/or the district without the MJG being 
informed. Based on discussions with the two local groups, there were limited 
funding opportunities for them to mobilize (processing NTFPs and fish products 
before trading) and maximize revenue, and the village committees were 
uncertain about their role in the use of the village development funds. 
 
Capacity:  Villagers of both local groups acquired skills, improved their techniques and 
collective actions within the villages and their management capacity in their operational 
units, and gained marketing/business skills and knowledge of ecology as they 
participated in various surveys, an educational awareness program, and other meetings 
with the village clusters and other technical teams. In both local groups, women’s 
capacities have increased as they actively participated in the learning process and events, 
including taking the lead on the issue of the processing of MJ products, the preparation 
of organic fertilizer, and the growing of organic vegetables.  
 
Nearly all the village heads informed the project that they had limited capacity 
in both groups, especially in the DFWM, regarding Ramsar site management as 
they found this a new area that was linked to an international convention.  Even 
though the village clusters were active on behalf of their members, they were not 
fully confident about presenting their ideas, debating or making arguments at 
high-level meetings or public meetings even when discussing issues that they 
were well acquainted with. Both local institutions’ members sought an 
enhancement of their capacities regarding administrative and financial matters, 
and more engagement by women and children’s groups. According to my 
observations, there is a great need to increase collaboration and the engagement 




Over the last two decades, the government of the Lao PDR has set an agenda of 
decentralization in order to meet MDG goals and achieve the several national targets 
that have been set in NSEDP18, FS202019, and other relevant international conventions 
(CBD, Ramsar, CITES and WH, and others).  The recent decentralization has been 
practiced with the aim of transferring responsibilities first to the provinces and then to 
the district and village levels (GoL, 2000) with more of a focus on public administration 
                                                   
18 NSDEP Goals – GDP rate at least 8% annually, achieve MDG goals by 2015, and graduate from being 
an LDC by 2020 
19 FS2020 target to achieve 70% of forest cover by 2020 
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services reform. As has been seen, this has been carried out in a few provinces that have 
been randomly selected as pilot areas in a rough and improper process of consultation 
and participation.  Until now, some efforts at decentralization have been established, as 
can be seen in the development of various policies and strategies at the central level, and 
the expansion of the scope of planning was increasingly seen to be more focused on 
management tools for preparation (planning) along the lines of the framework for 
decentralization in order that all levels of the administration be engaged in the process, 
with a strong emphasis on the provincial level, although this varied among the 
provinces. Overall, the planning process was not applied consistently, as has been seen 
in the Sam Sang where the process started without the introduction of a law and with 
limits on the extent to which the regulation was disseminated publicly. About 108 focal 
development villages in 51 districts of all 18 provinces were selected (including the 
capital, Vientiane) as pilot sites under this directive20.  However it seems that power 
still remains at the central level as can be seen in the notice released after October 2012 
(the review of the Sam Sang implementation) where Vientiane was selected as a pilot 
area for the implementation of this policy and tasks and responsibilities were still 
distributed among various ministries in Vientiane during the preparation for the 
implementation of the Sam Sang. 
In this working paper, an analysis of the introduction and development process of the 
two local institutions in Pathoumphone district was conducted in relation to 
decentralization regarding natural resources.  I found that decentralized governance 
regarding natural resources has satisfied the framework principles to some extent.  In 
the case of the MJG, there has been some progress in decentralization from the 
provincial authority in assigning a direct oversight role to the district level for the MJG 
and then on to the village clusters with regards to sharing some responsibilities. In 
reality, Pathoumphone district was not fully confident or competent when taking these 
decisions, and they performed their role on the basis of a transfer of functions, as can be 
seen in the fact that they always consulted the provincial authority before taking a 
decision.  In the case of the DFWMT, decentralization has not yet been implemented, 
as most decisions were taken by the provincial authority or at the central level (the 
provincial and national Ramsar Steering Committees or the national Ramsar Secretariat 
Office).  
This initiative is likely to get better, as improvements can be seen in the effectiveness of, 
and increase in, horizontal practice between the two local institutions in this district in 
the process of transferring responsibilities and some rights regarding natural resources 
governance.  As can be seen from the results of this case study, early successes 
resulted from the agreements and regulation made by both institutions. This resulted in a 
clear division of roles, responsibilities and powers at each level, and a mechanism of 
                                                   
20 Vice President’s speech, KPL Lao News Agency, 04 Feb 2013.  
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accountability between the local authority and the communities (a clear benefit sharing 
system). However, there are still some concerns (listed below) and recommendations 
from this analysis of the creation of the local institutions in relation to the 
decentralization regarding natural resources in the case study.  
Some questions arose as being pertinent during observations, the outcomes of 
discussions with the village clusters and the district, and discussions among and with 
the local villagers concerning the decentralization regarding natural resources in this 
district. They are as follows: 
 
 The long-term viability of the MJG toward a complete transfer power or a 
proper registration as an MJ Association, and the DFWMT, with the inclusion of 
more village representatives who can take a leading role in the management of 
the wetlands and the implementation of the Ramsar Convention; 
 The type of system and incentive mechanism in place for the active engagement 
of and increased responsiveness on the part of the local communities, especially 
by including them in the decision-making process regarding any initiatives in 
their area; 
 As decentralization is a government priority, should the village authority and the 
villagers receive direct funding to mobilize on their priorities and needs and 
establish a monitoring system by the village cluster and the district? 
 Institutional capacity building at the grassroots level, villages and village 
clusters should also be a priority for decentralization as can be seen in the high 
priority given and clear links to the recent Sam Sang. 
 
This working paper was focused so as to address some of these questions.  The 
question of the transfer of powers to govern natural resources to village or local 
institutions not having been completely addressed, there is the need for support from a 
legal framework.  However, the achievements of the MJ and DFWM groups can be 
used as a starting point that provides some success stories for decentralization regarding 
natural resources and contributes to some extent to the national goals of increasing 
forest cover (GoL, 1988) and alleviating poverty (GoL, 2003).  This can also provide 
an alternative way to stabilize shifting cultivation and reduce the over-extraction of 
forest products, through, in particular, a form of participatory natural resources 
management that links food security, nutrition and community development.  Overall, 
there is a great need to consider sustainable financing (refer to the third question) as an 
incentive for the input and efforts of local communities in managing the 
naturalresources surrounding their villages with a focus on strengthening a local 
institution’s capacity regarding administration, planning, and budgeting or a financing 
system.  However, with decentralization regarding natural resources in the case of 
Pathoumphone, the Lao PDR is in quite an early stage in terms of its institutional 
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arrangements and skills in managing natural resources, and it still needs support from 
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